REGULATORY AGENCY ACTION
lent concealment, or even negligent concealment not related to failure to inspect.
The court then held that "[i]fthe use of an
'as is' clause will not protect against
claims based on common law misrepresentation, a fortiori it will not insulate the
seller from claims based on the disclosure
requirements of section 1102 et seq."
The Fourth District therefore concluded that it is possible for Loughrin to
prevail in his contention that the purchase
contract was not intended to insulate Barr
from liability for misrepresentation in the
preparation of the statutory disclosure
form; accordingly, the court held that the
question could not be decided as a matter
of law, and it was error for the trial court
to issue its order denying recovery under
the first cause of action.

DEPARTMENT OF
SAVINGS AND LOAN
Interim Commissioner:
Keith Paul Bishop
(213) 897-8202
he Department of Savings and Loan
T
is headed by a commissioner
who has "general supervision over all as(DSL)

sociations, savings and loan holding companies, service corporations, and other
persons" (Financial Code section 8050).
The Savings and Loan Association Law is
in sections 5000 through I 0050 of the
California Financial Code. Departmental
regula1ions are in Chapter 2, Title IO of the
California Code of Regulations (CCR).
The Department regulates 15 state-chartered S&L institutions.

■ MAJOR PROJECTS
DSL Undergoes Quiet Transformation, Reduction. With hardly a word to
the press or public, and in the absence of
any legislative alteration of the Savings
and Loan Association Law and its delegation of regulatory authority to DSL, the
Wilson administration apparently closed
down the Department of Savings and
Loan on March 31 and created a three-person Office of Savings and Loan Administration (OSLA) comprised of an administrator, a financial analyst, and a secretary.
According to the March 22 issue of National Mortgage News, DSL's thrift examination staff had already been completely
eliminated in January, and California was
no longer examining any of the 15 remaining state-chartered thrifts. In June, Governor Wilson appointed Rosendo Castillo to
serve as OSLA's administrator; Castillo
previously served as a mortgage loan consultant for Great Western Bank.
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Although reformation of DSL into an
office has been widely expected as the
number of state-chartered S&Ls has declined and since the Governor vetoed SB
506 (McCorquodale) in September 1992
(which would have merged DSL into the
State Banking Department [ l 2:4 CRLR
157]), the Wilson administration has neither introduced legislation to amend the
Savings and Loan Association Law which
creates DSL nor suggested a reorganization plan to accomplish the transformation. However, the state's 1993-94 budget
allocates $449,000 to the "Office of Savings and Loan"-an entity which technically does not exist in state law, and which
may not legally be created through the
budget bill. The $449,000 allocation represents a severe cutback from DSL's
I 992-93 allocation of $3.7 million. Also
in the 1993-94 budget bill, the Governor
and legislature transferred over $1.9 million from the Department's special fund
(funded by assessments against statechartered institutions) to the state's general fund to help balance the budget.
In the absence of legislation creating
OSLA, DSL apparently reopened as the
"Department of Savings and Loan" on
July I. Castillo was replaced with Keith
Paul Bishop, named by the Governor as
Interim Commissioner of the Department.
According to Bishop, DSL's reduced budget, which he says "reflects the reduced
number of state-chartered associations,
the increased federal oversight of associations and an effort to streamline government and reduce costs," has resulted in a
much-reduced DSL staff and regulatory
program. In addition to Bishop, DSL employs one full-time examiner, one fulltime executive assistant, and a part-time
executive assistant. Further, according to
Bishop, "[t]he Department no longer conducts examinations of state-chartered institutions. Federal thrift regulators examine these institutions. The Department's
examiner reviews the federal examination
reports. In addition, state-chartered associations must seek the Department's approval prior to taking a number of actions
[e.g., under Financial Code section 5654],
and the Department continues to review
and act on these applications."
National Commission Recommends
Abolition of S&Ls. On July 27, the bipartisan National Commission on Financial
Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement, created by Congress to investigate the causes of the S&L crisis and to
suggest actions to prevent its recurrence,
released its findings and recommendations in a report entitled Origins and
Causes of the S&L Debacle: A Blueprint
for Reform. Among other things, the

Commission's report concludes that the
best way to avoid a repeat of the S&L
bailout is to abolish the S&L industry,
reduce federal deposit insurance coverage
("the 'necessary condition' for the debacle," according to the Commission), and
consolidate financial institution regulation. The study cites ineffective government regulation as the main reason for the
scandal; according the Commission, fraud
or corruption accounted for only I 0-15%
of the S&L crisis.
The Commission was created by the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1990; its members were appointed by the
President, the Speaker of the House, and
the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.
The Commission included co-chairs Andrew Brimmer, a former member of the
Federal Reserve Board who heads an economic and financial consulting firm, and
John Snow, Chair of CSX Corporation, an
international transportation company.
Other members included Elliott Levitas, a
former Democratic congress member from
Georgia; Robert Litan, director of the
Center for Law, Economics and Politics of
the Brookings Institution; and Joseph
Califano, Jr., former Democratic Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
The report notes that when federally
chartered S&Ls were hit by the interest
rate crisis of the late 1970s and early
1980s, federal regulators relaxed accounting rules to avoid closing institutions, all
but eliminating net worth requirements.
According to the report, states had to compete with the lax federal regulations by
becoming equally permissive; to keep
their S&Ls from switching to federal charters, states such as California, Florida and
Texas gave their S&Ls unlimited authority to invest in just about any activity, far
in excess of what federally chartered
S&Ls might do. [10:4 CRLR J] Further,
instead of monitoring S&Ls more closely
in this critical time, state and federal regulators did the opposite, according to the
Commission. The Commission notes that
"[r]egulators, the [Reagan] Administration, and Congress must share blame with
the industry for the S&L debacle .... By allowing accounting schemes that made insolvent S&Ls look healthy, by virtually
abolishing net worth requirements, and by
not raising red flags, regulators permitted
the powerful S&L lobby to convince the
public and many in Congress that the situation was under control."
The report also concludes that other
factors, including the following, contributed to the S&L crisis:
-The 1981 Tax Act provided a substantial tax preference for real estate investments and helped create an unsustainable
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speculative boom, in which many S&Ls
took part.
-Federal and state S&L regulators
were untrained to move against the abuses
that eventually surfaced in the industry.
-Regulators allowed accounting practices that not only masked the extent of
mounting problems, but also encouraged
abuse and fraud.
-Regional factors such as the collapse
of property values in the Sunbelt, particularly Texas, added to the losses.
-The Commission report also complains that the news media was "largely
silent" during the period when the damage
was being done.
According to the Commission, the
S&L industry has no future; in fact, the
Commission recommends that S&Ls
cease to be separately chartered and regulated entities, and that S&Ls be converted
into commercial banks. As a result, the
agencies regulating depository institutions could be consolidated, and the FDIC
could be made the sole federal insurer of
depository institutions, and the sole federal charterer and regulator of insured depositories. Under the Commission's recommendations, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of
Thrift Supervision would be eliminated.
Further, the Commission recommends
that federal deposit insurance be strictly
limited to accounts offered by entities called
monetary service companies (MSCs); only
MSCs would be able to offer governmentinsured accounts accessible for third-party
transactions using checks, electronic transfers, or cash withdrawals. The MSCs
would be separately capitalized, federally
insured institutions authorized to invest
only in short-term debt instruments for
which there is an active national market
(such as low-risk money market funds).
The MSCs would hold reserves at the Federal Reserve and have access to its discount window. Because these new institutions would hold only highly liquid market securities, the FDIC would mark their
condition to market daily, and calculate
risk exposures. The MSCs would be affiliated with other financial entities, including but not restricted to banks and savings
institutions, and they could share personnel and facilities.
Because the Commission places much of
the blame for the S&L crisis on Congress
and federal regulators, and because implementation of its recommendations would
entail actions by those entities and substantial changes in the existing financial institution industry, no legislation is expected to
emerge in the foreseeable future.
Congress Debates Extending Statute
of Limitations for S&L Actions. The

1989 law that created the federal Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) also established a three-year statute oflimitations on
bringing actions against former S&L officials for financial fraud and negligence. At
this writing, Congress is-for the fourth
time since I 991-considering whether it
should extend the statute of limitations
from three to five years. Previous attempts
to extend the provision have met with
significant-and successful-opposition
from the S&Ls themselves, their accountants, and their insurers. The current Senate proposal under consideration would
apply to any tort action; the House proposal would apply only to claims arising
from fraud or intentional misconduct.

■ LEGISLATION
SB 202 (Deddeh). Existing law provides that no savings association or subsidiary thereof, without the prior written
consent of the Savings and Loan Commissioner, shall enter into certain specified
transactions. As introduced February 4,
this bill would instead provide that no
savings association or subsidiary thereof,
without the prior written consent of the
Commissioner, and except as otherwise
permitted by law, shall enter into those
specified transactions. [S. BC&ITJ
SB 161 (Deddeh). Existing law requires
financial institutions to furnish depositors, if
not physically present at the time of the
initial deposit into an account, with a statement concerning charges and interest not
later than IO days after the date of the initial
deposit. As introduced February I, this bill
would instead require the statement to be
furnished not later than seven business days
after the date of the initial deposit. With
respect to an increase in the rate of account
charges or a variance in the interest rate, the
bill would reduce the notice time from fifteen days prior to date of change or variance
to seven business days.
The bill would also make technical,
clarifying changes in provisions specifying the maximum percentage of assets that
an association chartered by this state
under the Savings Association Law, including a savings bank, may invest in
specified loans made for agricultural,
business, commercial, or corporate purposes. [S. BC&IT]
AB 320 (Burton). Existing law does
not prescribe interest rates for bank credit
card accounts, but prohibits defined usurious interest rates for any loan or forbearance made by a nonexempt lender. As
introduced February 4, this bill would prescribe a maximum interest rate or finance
charge which could be charged on credit
card accounts issued by a bank, savings
association, or credit union. Except as oth-
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erwise provided, the interest rate or finance charge assessed with respect to any
account for which charges may be added
by the use of a bank credit card shall not
exceed an annual rate equal to 10% plus
the savings account interest rate paid by
the financial institution issuing the card.
{A. F&I]

AB 1995 (Archie-Hudson), as introduced March 5, would authorize statechartered banks, savings associations, and
credit unions to restructure a loan or extend credit terms and obligations to minority or women business enterprises in accordance with safe and sound financial
operations. Any loan so restructured or
extended shall not be classified as delinquent, and the financial institution shall
not be required to increase its reserves, or
be subject to adverse regulatory action
because of that loan. [A. F &/]
AB 1756 (Tucker), as amended June 9,
would prohibit state, city, and county governments from contracting for services with
financial institutions with $100 million dollars or more in assets unless those companies
file Community Reinvestment Act reports
annually with the Treasurer. The Treasurer
would be required to annually submit a report to the legislature and to make summaries available to the public. These reports
would include specified information regarding the nature of the governance of the companies, and their lending and investment
practices, with regard to race, ethnicity, gender, and income of the governing boards and
of the recipients of loans and contracts from
the institutions. {A. Inactive FileJ

■ LITIGATION
On July 8, former savings and loan
boss Charles Keating and his son, Charles
Keating III, were sentenced following
their January 1993 convictions on federal
charges of racketeering, bank and securities fraud, conspiracy, and the interstate
transportation of stolen goods. The elder
Keating, who is already serving a ten-year
state sentence for defrauding 25,000 investors out of $268 million by persuading
them to buy worthless junk bonds instead
of government-issued certificates, was
found guilty of all 73 counts brought
against him; his son was found guilty of
all 64 counts brought against him.
{13:2&3 CRLR 147] The elder Keating
was sentenced to twelve years and seven
months in federal prison for the racketeering and securities violations; his son was
sentenced to eight years and one month.
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